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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
__________ 
 
No. 13-2716 
__________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JOSE CRUZ, 
            Appellant 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. No. 1-12-cr-00091-009) 
District Judge: Hon. Christopher C. Conner 
 
__________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 11, 2014 
 
Before: CHAGARES, SHWARTZ and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: March 7, 2014) 
 
__________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________          
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
Jose Cruz appeals the judgment of the United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania sentencing him to 120 months’ incarceration for distribution and 
possession with the intent to distribute cocaine hydrochloride, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
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§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). Cruz contends the District Court improperly calculated his 
criminal history points under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(k)(1) by assigning three points for his 
2001 and 2007 state convictions, respectively. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
I. 
Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and the 
proceedings in this case, we will revisit them only briefly. On April 11, 2012, a grand 
jury returned a seven-count indictment against Cruz, including a charge of distribution 
and possession of cocaine hydrochloride (Count IV). On December 17, 2012, Cruz pled 
guilty to Count IV pursuant to a written plea agreement.   
The U.S. Probation Office prepared a presentence investigation report (“PSR”), 
which assigned 13 total criminal history points to Cruz.
1
 This incorporated six points for 
two state convictions: one in 2001 for possession of marijuana (“2001 conviction”) and 
another in 2007 for possession of a controlled substance (“2007 conviction”). For Cruz’s 
2001 conviction, the state court sentenced Cruz to 30 days to 12 months of imprisonment. 
Though Cruz was paroled, his parole was revoked and he was ordered to serve the 
balance of three months and 23 days. For his 2007 conviction, the state court sentenced 
Cruz to 12 months’ probation, which was later revoked and Cruz was ordered to serve six 
to 12 months’ imprisonment. Cruz was then paroled while serving this sentence, but his 
parole was again revoked and he was ordered to serve the balance of four months and 
four days.  
                                              
1
 Cruz does not object to seven of the criminal history points. 
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The PSR assigned three criminal history points for Cruz’s 2001 and 2007 
convictions, respectively, which resulted in a criminal history category of VI. Cruz filed 
an objection to the PSR and reiterated his objection at the sentencing hearing, arguing 
that only two criminal history points should be assigned for each of the 2001 and 2007 
convictions. The Court rejected Cruz’s argument, citing to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(k), which 
instructs courts to add any term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation of parole or 
probation to the initial stated maximum sentence to determine criminal history points. 
Because the sums of the stated maximums and revocation sentences for the 2001 and 
2007 convictions each exceeded one year and one month, the District Court determined 
that the PSR correctly assigned three criminal history points for each conviction. 
After hearing testimony and arguments from both parties and resolving all 
objections, the Court adopted the PSR.
2
 The Court sentenced Cruz to 120 months’ 
incarceration based on Cruz’s offense level of 26 and his criminal history category of VI. 
Cruz now appeals.
3
  
II. 
“Our review of the District Court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines and 
constitutional questions is plenary.” United States v. McKoy, 452 F.3d 234, 236 (3d Cir. 
2006) (citation omitted). 
                                              
2
 The Court sustained the Government’s objection to a three-point Guidelines credit in 
the PSR for Cruz’s acceptance of responsibility, raising Cruz’s offense level from 23 to 
26.  
3
 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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Cruz contends that the District Court erred in assigning three criminal history 
points instead of two for his 2001 and 2007 convictions, respectively.
4
 The Guidelines 
provide the following instructions to calculate criminal history points: 
(a) Add 3 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year 
and one month. 
(b) Add 2 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment of at least sixty days 
not counted in (a). 
 
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1. For prior indeterminate sentences, “the length of a sentence of 
imprisonment is the stated maximum.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, cmt. n.2. The Guidelines 
further provide:  
In the case of a prior revocation of probation, parole, supervised release, special 
parole, or mandatory release, add the original term of imprisonment to any term of 
imprisonment imposed upon revocation. The resulting total is used to compute the 
criminal history points for § 4A1.1(a), (b), or (c), as applicable.  
 
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(k)(1) (emphasis added). Accordingly, district courts are to add any 
revocation sentences to the stated maximum to calculate criminal history points. 
III. 
Cruz sets forth four arguments for why the District Court erred in its assignment of 
criminal history points for his 2001 and 2007 convictions. We address Cruz’s arguments 
in turn and conclude that the District Court did not err. 
First, Cruz argues that the District Court’s assignment of three criminal history 
points is based on a legally impossible characterization of the underlying state sentences. 
Cruz notes that the terms of imprisonment relied on by the District Court—the sums of 
                                              
4
 The total points from U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a) to (e) determine the applicable criminal 
history category in the Sentencing Table in Chapter 5, Part A. 
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the stated maximums and the revocation sentences for the 2001 and 2007 convictions, 
respectively—exceed the possible punishment for the respective crimes under state law. 
Before proceeding further, we reject Cruz’s contention that state law should be used to 
interpret the Guidelines. Courts interpreting the Guidelines “must look to federal, not 
state law.” McKoy, 452 F.3d at 237. Accordingly, we reject Cruz’s argument that the 
District Court erred in assigning three criminal history points because doing so conflicts 
with state law. 
Second, Cruz argues that the formula for addressing revocation terms in 
§ 4A1.2(k)(1) should be reconsidered in light of the rule of lenity. Cruz’s argument is 
unconvincing. “The rule of lenity applies only if, after seizing everything from which aid 
can be derived, we can make no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.” Reno 
v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 65 (1995) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). We 
find the meaning of § 4A1.2(k)(1) to be clear and unambiguous. Section 4A1.2(k)(1) 
instructs that Cruz’s revocation sentences are to be added to the stated maximums for 
both the 2001 and 2007 convictions. We reject Cruz’s argument and hold that the rule of 
lenity does not apply.  
Third, Cruz argues that the District Court’s sentence violated his procedural due 
process rights because it is a “re-characterization” of his original state sentences. Reply 
Br. 3. We disagree. We note that “[e]nhancement statutes . . . in the nature of criminal 
history provisions such as those contained in the Sentencing Guidelines . . . do not change 
the penalty imposed for the earlier conviction.” Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 
747 (1994). Thus, the District Court’s assignment of criminal history points under the 
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Guidelines did not re-characterize or change the penalty imposed for Cruz’s earlier 
convictions. See id.  
We also reject Cruz’s contention that he was denied due process because he was 
entitled to respond to the possibility of future sentencing enhancements when he “was 
sentenced in state court in 2001 and 2007.” Reply Br. 4. Cruz offers no evidence that he 
was not warned of potential future enhancements in 2001 and 2007. Moreover, warning a 
defendant that he “will be treated more harshly” if he is later charged criminally “would 
merely tell him what he must surely already know.” Nichols, 511 U.S. at 748-749 
(holding that due process does not require a defendant to be warned that his conviction 
might be used for enhancement purposes if he is later convicted of another crime). 
Due process only requires notice and an opportunity to respond to the factual 
predicate and the potential punishments in sentencing. United States v. Ausburn, 502 
F.3d 313, 322 (3d Cir. 2007). Here, Cruz had notice of the facts and prior convictions 
underlying the PSR’s calculations. He was also given an opportunity to object to the 
calculation and fully briefed the issue. Thus, Cruz’s due process rights were not violated.  
Finally, Cruz argues that the District Court’s calculations violate the ex post facto 
clause. The ex post facto clause applies to laws that retroactively alter the definition of 
criminal conduct or increase the punishment for criminal acts. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. v. 
Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 504 (1995). As applied to the Sentencing Guidelines, an ex post 
facto problem exists if the relevant Guideline has been materially changed between the 
instant offense and the sentencing. United States v. Wood, 486 F.3d 781, 790 (3d Cir. 
2007). The Sentencing Commission made no material changes to the relevant portions of 
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§ 4A1.1 or § 4A1.2 between the date of the offense (September 2009) and the sentencing 
hearing before the District Court (May 2013). Accordingly, there are no ex post facto 
issues.  
We have considered all of the arguments advanced by the parties and conclude 
that no further discussion is necessary. The judgment of the District Court will be 
affirmed. 
